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Editorial

THE Church Assembly at its session this month is to consider the Report of its Commission on *Church and State*, which was reviewed in the May issue of THEOLOGY by the Bishop of Durham (now of Winchester). We hope that the Assembly will adopt the resolutions that are to be proposed, with something like the unanimity that was reached by the Commission. It is reasonable to hope that the recommendations of the Commission in regard to Prayer Book revision may break the deadlock which has existed since the rejection by parliament of the Deposited Book in 1927–8. We are particularly glad to see the emphasis on the requirement of the consent of the House of Laity to proposed changes; for the time has passed when it could be supposed that they are unconcerned in the public worship of the Church.

The only one of the Commission's recommendations which falls below the wisdom and common sense that are characteristic of the Report is that concerning the suggested committee to advise the Archbishops with regard to vacant bishoprics. This suggestion has justly been criticized not only by the Bishop of Winchester,[1] but also by the Bishop of London[2] and by Sir Ernest Barker.[3] We observe that the Commission's recommendation of this committee is optional, at the discretion of the Archbishops, and not to be binding on their successors. We may therefore hope that the Church Assembly will give to the Archbishops a lead in this matter by indicating its preference for the continuance of informal consultations to the proposed institution of a formal committee. As Sir Ernest Barker says, this proposal "magnifies machinery, and turns quiet and confidential conversations into semi-public negotiations". There are committees which are a necessary evil, but there is no necessity whatever for this committee; the purpose it would be designed to serve can be far better secured without any elaborate machinery and therefore without the need for safeguarding that machinery from abuse.

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Father Herbert Thurston, S.J. (1856–1939) was a notable savant and an attractive personality. It is a pleasure to read Father Crehan's well-constructed memoir of his life and labours.[4] Father Thurston had the straightforward interests of an historian and an insatiable

[1] See THEOLOGY, May 1952, p. 165.
[2] See *The London Churchman*, March 1952, p. 4.
[3] See *The Frontier*, March 1952, p. 106.
[4] *Father Thurston*. By Joseph Crehan, S.J. Sheed and Ward. 10s. 6d.

appetite for unearthing facts, and in consequence he often offended the devout. He had no interest in ideas as such or in metaphysical speculation. He was in this respect the English counterpart of Mgr Duchesne, though he lacked Duchesne's genius and devastating wit. Like Duchesne he did not attempt to deal with Biblical history. But his researches and published work covered an extraordinary range of topics in liturgiology, hagiography, the highways and byways of ecclesiastical history, psychic phenomena, and fancy religions. He wrote no *magna opera*, but he was an indefatigable writer of articles for periodicals and in much demand as a contributor to encyclopedias: the bibliography of his writings occupies nearly forty pages of the memoir and will serve as an index to a vast amount of curious information. The chapters of the memoir, despite the outward uneventfulness of Thurston's life, are never monotonous and are often diverting, partly because of the controversies in which he was almost incessantly engaged with his co-religionists as well as with others. The chapter on Thurston's friendship and relations with Father Tyrrell suffers from the fact that Thurston's letters to Tyrrell have not survived; and it does not yet seem possible for a book bearing the *imprimatur* to show a deep and close sympathy with Tyrrell's mind and experience. On the other hand, the chapter on Thurston as "The Counsellor of Souls" is very perceptive and reveals how much more he was than a *mere* savant.

The Theological College in a Changing World

Theological colleges are now round about a century old. It is not enough to define their function as "training for the ministry" without further qualification, since this was carried on centuries before they were ever thought of. If it were simply a question of equipping men for the priesthood, they would probably never have arisen. Their emergence was bound up with the fact that "training for the ministry" has historically included two very different undertakings: (*a*) the supply of men technically equipped to carry out the specifically ministerial tasks of the Church, prophetic, pastoral and priestly; and (*b*) the supply of men capable of exercising leadership in the Church's name in the social order of their day. The requirements of the first differ from age to age only in externals (though the externals are vitally important), being governed by the abiding demands of the Christian gospel. Moreover, the recruitment of men for the priesthood should in theory cut right across the shifting class-structures of society, men from all strata being equally needed to meet the Church's responsibility to the different sorts and conditions of men within it.

The second task, that of providing the Church's leadership, must, on the other hand, be constantly changing with the social order within which it has to be exercised, and it is intimately bound up with the supply of men from that section of society which does in

fact hold the position of dominance within it—in the widest sense, the "clerisy" of the period.

Now the theological colleges have obviously done much to improve the purely technical standards of "priestcraft", but their existence was occasioned by changes in the second demand (that of leadership), and their function and future must be judged from this point of view. The rapid developments of society in the nineteenth century and the increased specialization of life challenged the adequacy of amateur leadership in every field. Training for leadership became a conscious social enterprise. It showed itself in the reform of the universities, in the great expansion of the public schools with a new and more or less defined policy, and in the establishment of professional institutes in many fields. The Church's ministry became consolidated as a profession, like all the rest. The days alike of the gentleman farmer and of the amateur who entered holy orders from the background of a general liberal education became numbered. Theological colleges and agricultural colleges made their appearance on the English scene about the same time.

The result of the theological college system and of the G.O.E., for all its many and great advantages, has been an enormous standardization and professionalization of the ministry. The non-professional ministry, except in the dwindling instance of the schoolmaster-parson, has ceased to exist. And the professional ministry is for the most part cut to a single pattern. It has also resulted in the ministry becoming from a class point of view almost solidly upper bourgeoisie. If anyone enters it from a working-class background he is effectively de-classed in the process of his training and location. The consequence is the complete identification in the popular mind between the minister and the clergyman: the pastor-priest is visualized automatically as a member of a professional clerisy occupying a definite (though diminishing) position in the contemporary class-structure.

The analysis of the future of the theological college which follows is based on the assumption that, if the Church is to be at all adequate to its job in the second half of the twentieth century, the existing situation must be altered in two ways.

(1) The identification of the ministry with the clerical profession will have to go. It is becoming increasingly evident that such an identification is evangelistically disastrous (one cannot convert a country with a single-class ministry) and economically insupportable. Yet the really frightening thing about, for instance, the Bishop of Southwell's recent article in *The Times* and the leader given to it—more frightening than the figures quoted—was the complete and unquestioning acceptance of this identification. The whole purpose of the Bishop's article, reflecting presumably official policy behind it, was "to advance the claims of the ministry *as a profession*". Now, it seems to not a few that the only hope of salvation for the Church of England, economically as well as evangelistically, is to recognize without further delay, and to act on the recognition, that the coming pattern of its ministry is bound to be largely non-professional, in the sense that its priesthood will consist in great proportion of men

working in secular jobs at every level, both manual and administrative. The co-ordination and direction of these men must remain the responsibility of the full-time priest (perhaps nearer to the pattern of the second-century bishop), whose organizational unit, whether on a residential or occupational basis, would be bound to be considerably larger than the traditional English parish. The relatively small highly-trained leadership would primarily be engaged in leading their regiment from behind—supplying a directive, inspiration, and ammunition to those who had some real chance of breaking through the front line because they were actually living in it. Though working priests would take their proper part in the corporate Sunday worship of the parish community, their prime day-to-day responsibility would be their "house-church" in the street-block, the factory, the office, or the school, where they were living or working. Their centre of reference would not be directly to the parish church (as with the present lay-reader) so much as to the hive of Christian existence within which, pastorally and sacramentally, they would, as it were, act as the queen bee in a way that an unordained man never could.

For the training of such a non-professional ministry the existing theological college set-up would be virtually irrelevant. For it is essential that it must be done *without* taking men out of the jobs and milieu in which they are. The experience of the trade unions in training their leadership through night classes, summer schools, Ruskin College, etc., should give the Church something to work on. To pursue this matter further would be fascinating, but not relevant to our present subject, which is the function and future of the traditional theological college.

(2) The second great change that must come over the existing ecclesiastical set-up is concerned with the nature of the professional ministry itself. Though considerably smaller in numbers, this will assume a crucial position in the total strategy of the Church. It must be frankly recognized that here we are concerned with training a *leadership*. This will involve various shifts of emphasis—for instance, a considerable stepping up of the intellectual standard from the present dead level of G.O.E., and the increasing selection of men not *merely* on the grounds of a genuine vocation to the priesthood, but also on further qualifications of personal and administrative ability. But the chief change that must come is the recognition that the *kind* of leadership which the Church must throw up if it is to take its effective part in the coming society is bound to be very different from that which the existing theological college system was created to supply. This new leadership is, however, in direct succession to the old, and, unless the Church is going to default on the coming society very grievously, the theological colleges must adapt themselves to meet the new need. The vital question for the Church is whether the present colleges are fertile enough to germinate within them the seeds of their own decay (or, rather, of their transformation), or whether they are going to retire above the timber-line altogether and continue to train an increasingly irrelevant ministry.

Before defining the new leadership required, one must stress again

that here one is dealing inevitably with a definite class ministry. Though it may be recruited, particularly in a time of social transition like the present, from a widish area of society, nevertheless, if it is to exercise its required function in the community, it is bound to take its place in that social grouping which does in fact mould the contemporary order. This fact has been recognized in the past—*e.g.*, in the conscious ideal of "English gentlemen in holy orders". In capitalist society leadership lay in the hands of the economically independent—hence the stress on the parson's freehold and its survival in the M.N.I.'s ironical classification of the clergy as "self-employed persons". But to-day the independence of the small man counts for little, and it is not surprising that the average parson's opportunity of effective leadership in the community in face of the giant corporations and bureaucracies of our age is virtually nil.

I am assuming (though I cannot stop to argue) the substantial truth of the thesis that the type of society which has already gone far to supersede the capitalist order here as all over the world is the managerial one. That is to say, it is to the manager class that social hegemony is rapidly passing. Consequently, if the Church is to retain any control over the shaping of this new order, it must equip leaders capable of playing a confident and respected part in the managerial circles where for good or ill its pattern is already being shaped.[1] At the moment this is one of the last things that the theological colleges are producing.

It is easy to say that the managerial society is extremely distasteful in prospect and the managerial virtues just the opposite of those which the Church should be encouraging. (Exactly the same ought of course to have been said, and indeed was said, at the advent of the capitalist society.) But the fact remains that the God-directed dialectic of history has produced this order for us and that it is likely to be with us for a very long time ahead. The Church must either baptize it, or contract out of its responsibilities to mould and control it. As the princes of the Gentiles exercise authority, managerial power is likely to express itself in the bureaucratic, totalitarian and depersonalizing forms with which we are already familiar. But if the Church is not to go out of the world altogether, it must show that a leadership can be exercised in this context which is still that of the Good Shepherd.

The type of the future professional ministry may conveniently be considered by reference to its secular equivalents. In capitalist society the ministry has traditionally been set in comparison with the other independent professions—medicine, the law, schoolmastering, etc.—and training for it conducted in a corresponding way. The nearest equivalents of the clergy in the future are likely rather to be such men as welfare officers, personnel managers, employment officers, children's officers, almoners, education officers, youth organizers, pro-

[1] This does not mean the turning out of a new version of "boss's men". Perhaps the naval chaplain at his best provides the pattern of the "officer-trained" man who yet in rank and status can be accepted as belonging equally to the lower deck.

bation officers, etc.—that is to say, executives of some large concern holding managerial posts of varying responsibility, some of them specifically administrative but all dealing more or less directly with persons. Consequently, it is to the kind of training demanded for such posts that the Church may well look for guidance in the planning of its future theological college syllabus.

The following are excerpts from managerial training prospectuses which may give some idea of the sort of thing I have in mind.

The first is from *Training for Personnel Management* (Institute of Personnel Management, Hill Street, W.1).

> Training comprises the acquisition of knowledge and skill of three main kinds:
>
> Knowledge of modern society in its social, economic, and ethical aspects.
>
> Knowledge of the functions of a personnel department, and a practical knowledge required for their performance.
>
> Acquisition of the skill required of a personnel officer.
>
> The Institute therefore considers that a student should study at least one subject in each of the following groups:
>
> (i) Social philosophy or ethics; general psychology; and industrial psychology.
>
> (ii) Economics (including social economics); economic history; structure of industry; business administration.
>
> (iii) Industrial relations; industrial law.
>
> (iv) Social administration.
>
> (v) Personnel management.
>
> (vi) Management practice, and such 'tools' of management as statistics, work measurement, office management and method, financial accounting and cost accounting.
>
> In addition, he should obtain industrial or commercial experience in production departments, training under direction in personnel departments, and experience of social work.

Secondly, the following from the syllabus of a course on works management will give some indication of the mechanics involved.

> Emphasis is laid throughout on the practical aspects of the Works Manager's job. Lectures . . . ensure the transmission of the requisite factual information, but wherever possible this formal instruction is given practical application, as in the Time-study laboratory. The student will be required to make weekly field studies and to report subsequently in Tutorials on practices and problems seen, together with proposed solutions or suggestions for improvements. Industrial executives will advise, as Visiting Speakers, on how problems have been tackled in their own plant and with what degree of success.
>
> During the two vacation periods of five weeks each, the students must work in Industry . . . to study a particular problem, report on it in detail and work out a recommended solution.
>
> Part of the course takes the form of 'Project Work'. Periodic Progress Reports are expected and made the subject of discussion in tutorial periods. (*Education for Management*, Glasgow School of Management Studies.)

Clearly much of this would have to be modified to suit the requirements of the Christian ministry, but *mutatis mutandis* I believe that something like it must form the pattern of theological college training of the future. To many this may seem a pretty grim prospect. But if we are to train leadership at all, it must be socially relevant to the community in which that leadership has got to be exer-

cised. The idea of a professional ministry has been the implicit *raison d'être* of the theological colleges; and they have in the past performed their function tolerably adequately—though it has been a disaster alike for the Church and society that the professional, class ministry has been the only ministry. But there is considerable feeling abroad that in recent years they have increasingly failed to prepare men for the kind of job which the Church should be doing to-day. They are not turning out *confident* men, not confident in themselves (which God forbid), but confident that they know what is required of them and that they are technically equipped to meet it.

It is only necessary to tie all this up with what has so far been quite consciously neglected, though it is the most indispensable factor in any training for the ministry—namely, the vocation to the priesthood itself.

The fact that the Christian ministry is first and last and all the time a function of the Body of Christ, the call to be a priest *in the Church of God*, means that it cannot be sustained, exercised or prepared for except within the context of the Worshipping Community. The student of personnel management and the rest may procure his training, simply as an individual, in a non-residential institute. One of the indispensable functions of a theological college, on the other hand—indeed, the one absolutely essential test by which it stands or falls—is that it shall really *be* the Church *in nuce*, a Fellowship of Holy Spirit from which each member of it may go out with a vision and a power to plant the seeds of the Holy Community wherever he may be working. This applies with equal cogency to the training for the non-professional ministry: unless it is undertaken, probably in twos and threes, within the context of a really live Christian group, whether parochial or occupational, it is almost certainly doomed. But in the case of the professional ministry this is what must make a residential college essential. Where the new pattern must differ from the present is in giving up the assumption that the whole of a man's training must be received within the four walls of such a college. This was in fact never the traditional theory, since a man's diaconate and curacies were all regarded as part of his preparation. The Church's man-power shortage has effectively killed this happy assumption, and such is the gulf anyhow between the Church and the world to-day that mere immersion in the average parochial round is quite incapable of providing any real equivalent of "experience in production departments". Much of the work of the theological colleges in the future must be done outside their own walls, whether that means the students doing their "field-studies" from the college as their base, or going away for longer stretches to work in the world, or both. Anyhow, everything will depend upon the community life of the college being strong enough to carry such excursions from its centre and also upon the teaching, both academic and devotional, being dynamically related to the questions and tensions which such a dialectical existence is bound, and indeed is intended, to provoke.

JOHN A. T. ROBINSON.

Male and Female[1]

THE nature of man and woman and their mutual relationship have always been topics of inquiry and speculation. For centuries the main writing was poetic, philosophical, or theological. Now it is mainly scientific. Each stage of the inquiry carries the question "What is man?" to a new level and opens up new questions. Nothing is settled cut and dried: indeed discussion within and between the sciences is brisk and popular interest in its wider implications is very considerable.

One would have thought that the theologians, who from St Paul on have had something to say about the sexes, would have been party to the present discussion. True, they write about marriage, but one looks in vain for any theological counterpart of Margaret Meade's anthropological study *Male and Female* or of *Le Deuxième Sexe* of Simone de Beauvoir, books which treat not only marriage but the wide sweep of the nature and relation of the sexes. The absence of a notable theological contribution to the present discussion is my excuse for selecting from Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik* the chapters in which he deals with man and woman.

These chapters, regarded as a contribution to the wider debate on man and woman, are a strictly theological contribution. They have their own premisses and their own vocabulary. The line of Barth's thought has to be followed within its own terms of reference and they are Biblical. For this reason what he has to say cannot be regarded as an addendum to scientific knowledge: what it achieves is a different perspective.

The heart of Barth's theology, as I understand it, is revelation. God reveals his purpose, which is to establish a relation between himself and man, a Covenant of Grace. Man rejects the covenant: only in Christ is it fulfilled and therefore only through Christ can we see the covenant of grace or know what God's purpose in creation was. The doctrine of creation, the subject of the volume, is, says Barth, as much an act of faith as any other doctrine. It is the faith that God made man a creature for relationship with him; he created man in his own image. What does this phrase "in his own image" mean? The Church fathers, says Barth, produced some complicated explanations, perhaps because they were afraid to take what the first chapter of Genesis says quite simply. What this chapter says of the creation of man is "in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them". The image of God in man is the creation of the sexes. Barth goes on to explain how this is so. After all else has been created, God communes with himself "Let us make man in our image". God is not by himself alone: there is communion and love in the Godhead. If man is to be capable of communion with God, he also must have this capacity and necessity for communion. So man and woman are made, each unlike the other, each dependent on the other, neither complete humanity without the other. This is

[1] A review broadcast in the Third Programme on 25 March, 1952.

the first and pattern form of communion in humanity. Barth is at pains to show that his interpretation of the creation of the sexes does not rest on a single text. The second creation story has, he says, the same meaning. Alone with the animals Adam is no more than potential man. Only when woman is made and in speech he establishes communion with her is man's humanity complete. The Old Testament shows how relations between the sexes fall to the level of the domination of man over woman: but the pattern is the love of God for Israel foreshadowing the love of Christ for his church.

If this interpretation of the image of God as the creation of the sexes can be sustained, it seems to me to have some important consequences. The creation of the sexes instead of being something of an addendum to the doctrine of creation, with the status of an unfortunate necessity, is carried right to the heart of the doctrine as the condition, on man's side, of the covenant of grace. Secondly it denies that procreation, the continuity of the species, is the only or even the main purpose of God in the creation of the sexes. Instead of regarding the richness and variety of differences between the sexes as a colouring of life by biological function, Barth asserts that physical sexuality is only one part of a whole.

In the latest volume Barth turns, still within the context of the creation, to ethics. The question he asks is what is God's command in relation to the sexes? He first makes three clarifications: these I shall state without comment. Then he makes three propositions, and these are the core of his whole thesis. He ends with a more detailed discussion of marriage than I have space to describe. The most characteristic part of his work is the three propositions. But here are the clarifications. First in this matter of the sexes men and women are subject to a certain limitation—not however the kind of limitation which has caused so many Christian theologians and moralists to identify morality with sex morality. The experience of love between the sexes is, says Barth, a blessed frenzy, a breathtaking dialectic of self-fulfilment and self-forgetfulness. Many movements of romanticism, many religions the world over, have deified the experience. The effect of this deification is that God becomes assimilated to man as a part of his experience, nothing more than an idol. Sexual love belongs to man's existence as creature. It is not sinful: in his sexuality man is not abandoned by God, he is in his Father's house, but he has a master in God's command. Barth's second clarification is that since the creation of the sexes is part of the condition created by God for the making of a covenant between God and man, sex cannot possibly be regarded as a thing in itself. Only the man who is striving to obey God wholly can obey him in matters of sex. Thirdly, Barth insists that although the creation of the sexes looks towards marriage as its fulfilment, marriage does not exhaust its meaning. The relation of the sexes throughout public life has therefore to come within any theological ethic.

Having disposed of these clarifications Barth comes to the three propositions in which he defines a theological ethic of man and woman.

To begin with the simplest proposition, says Barth, the creation means the creation of every human being as a man or a woman, and the first command of God in the realm of ethics is that each should be what he has been created. But to assume in advance that we know what it is to be a man or a woman is to claim knowledge in advance of what God's command is, to presume to know his secret. For there is an element of mystery here: no man or woman completely and assuredly knows what it is to be one of the other sex, and knowledge of what it is to be one's own sex is always acquired in relation to the other. Barth says in the most downright way that no definitions or descriptions of the sexes which we might put forward are the same as what God intends when he bids a man or a woman to stand for what he or she is in his or her own historical and social situation. This view of the unknown and changing nature of the sexes runs quite counter to most current thinking in the churches. I am familiar with a great number of the reports and memoranda written in recent years in Europe on the ordination of women. These reports are shot through with the assumption that the Church with 2,000 years of experience of men and women knows the nature of the sexes as determined by God. Those who oppose the ordination of women are certain that they know the role assigned by God to each sex: those who support it equally assume a God-given likeness transcending sex difference or a sphere in which differences of sex do not apply. Only here and there is justice done to the complexity of knowing what it is to be a man or to be a woman in a particular historical context.

His emphasis on the unknown element, on the fact that to be a man or a woman is a progressive becoming, brings Barth close to Simone de Beauvoir. If only, he says, her book *Le Deuxième Sexe* could be made required reading in all our churches, how many things so often said in them could be said no more, or said only with great reserve. But he parts company with her because, he says, having exposed the past myths of woman which have helped to hold women in bondage, she now promulgates a new one, the woman who transcends her sex. But, he comments, this emergent woman has noticeably masculine traits. If envy of the other sex enters in, there is certainly a denial of God's command. A more subtle because a nobler denial is to want to escape from one's sex not into the other sex but into some sexless conception of personality. This is the particular temptation of the modern women's movement, with whose aspirations Barth clearly has the warmest sympathy. I think he is right in pointing out a tendency there to assume that sex affects the lives of men and women over a small area and that outside this they are on common ground as persons. Barth insists that neither here nor in eternity is there any possible person than a man or a woman: personality and sex are in the creation made inseparable: to neutralize sex is to dehumanize persons.

The first main proposition was "man *or* woman". The second is "man *and* woman". To obey God's command is, says Barth, "to live in relation and belongingness to the other sex". This, he says, is the core of the whole inquiry. Man and woman are mutually for each

other "horizon and concrete orientation", and this direction towards each other constitutes the nature of both. This is true not only in marriage. Woman is man's partner also in other aspects of life, not as an abstraction, as the idea of woman, as Mary the Virgin, but as this or that actual woman who comes into relation with him as mother, sister, friend, fellow-worker. And the man is also partner for the woman. To obey the command of God, men and women must consciously accept this relationship and interdependence, for in it each discovers what it is to be man or woman. Barth says nothing of the practical problems of the relations of the sexes in a free society like our own. He assumes that they are known and lays his finger on less commonly discussed difficulties underlying the practical ones. The other sex is an eternal riddle, but one which one is bound by God's command to see and understand. One has to accept the perpetual disturbing fact that another sex exists so unlike oneself which yet claims to be fully human. There is no escaping from the strain into the life of a one-sex institution, without something of a disobedience to God's command. In all this it will be seen that there is complete reciprocity. All that is said about one sex applies *mutatis mutandis* to the other. Barth utters a warning that this is not the whole story, but he insists that although he is going to have something to say about an order of the sexes "the reciprocity of the sexes and what is common in their mutual relation are more important than their differences".

The third proposition is that the command of God promulgates an order between the sexes. This comes before Barth's treatment of marriage: he is still talking about the general relation of the sexes. He embarks on his third proposition with obvious diffidence, warns his readers that he will be misunderstood, and repeats that he does not retract anything said up to now. Although man and woman are terms to which no definite content can be given, yet the relation of the sexes is subject to a divine ordering. The sexes are related not as two halves of an hourglass, nor as two A's, but as an A and a B. A is not B, nor B, A; A goes before B, B follows after A. Order means succession—it means precedence and following, priority and subordination. Man is before and above woman and this is his place in an order which he does not make, but accepts from God and is responsible under God for carrying out. The concern and task of the woman is to realize her humanity in accepting the leadership and initiative of man. Apart from such an order, says Barth, there is no alternative but chaos: there is no third possibility.

This sounds very much like the line taken by past expositors of Pauline teaching who have used his writing to justify their own or their church's opposition to any expanding opportunity for women to use their gifts in the church or in society. Barth maintains that it is *not* the same. There is greater freedom in it than there appears to be, because all this order is within the context of the new life in Christ. It justifies neither the tyrannical man, nor the subservient woman, nor does it allow any imposition of such an order by force. The authority exercised by men and the submission given by women

are forms of obedience to God. And, he adds, the submission asked by Christ of women is a submission *sui generis* and is contorted as soon as it is compared with any other form of submission.

In conversation with Karl Barth, I raised the question why he used these terms and he made a significant comment. An essential part of progress, he said, is to rescue words and conceptions from corruption by restoring to them their proper meaning. Has Barth succeeded in rescuing the words "order", "authority" and "submission" in relation to the sexes? My first comment is this. Often it is on a very small point that an argument takes a turn from which the arguer cannot recall it. Barth frequently refers to man and woman as A and B, and his argument gets saddled with the implications they bear. Leave the A and B of the written alphabet and turn to the A and B of music. Here A does not always lead and B follow, A can be both above and below B. Yet the result is not chaos and disorder. For A is never B, never replaces B, and A and B are always in a fixed and limited relation to each other. There is an intricate pattern of leading and following, now by one now by the other, much more like the relation of the sexes than the A and B of the alphabet which, intended only to suggest relation, suggest value.

Secondly I question whether Barth can convey what I think he means in the context of church life to-day. St Paul was speaking to a church in Corinth where the Pauline principle that there is neither male nor female but all are one in Christ, had run riot. I know a church where two women legally elected to the central elective body of the church were turned away at the doors because they were women. I know of many churches in which although women have the right, on paper, to vote for the officers of the church, the men make it quite clear that women ought not to vote and that their votes would not be allowed. I know of churches in which highly trained women employed by the church are treated as the church's scullery maids. All this and more is justified by appeal to the references in the Pauline epistles to authority and submission as the respective roles of men and women. Can authority and submission be made meaningful in Barth's sense in churches which seem to have been so little affected by Paul's great declaration that male and female are one?

Lastly, I am not sure that this insistence on the use of the words "authority" and "submission" may not cut at the root of Barth's own theology. If St Paul is taken *au pied de la lettre,* he quite explicitly stated that *man* is the image of God, and woman is the glory of the man. There are several passages in St Paul which cut right across Barth's insistence that mutuality in the relation of man and woman are prior to and more important than authority and submission. Once Barth has castigated, as he does, any notion of an order (God, Christ, man, woman) in a continuous hierarchy as "absurd" he takes his stand firmly on the mutuality of relationship between the sexes. How can an order of authority and submission be fitted into this? I think the incongruity between the first two and the last of his three propositions derives from his omission from the relationship of man and woman of all mention of the rest of the creation, the physical

external world. Man and woman are more directly related in his theology than is true to life, where they are indirectly related. The greatest differences between the sexes show in their handling of the exterior world. Here we see the mastery made by man over nature, over forms of conceptual thinking including the arts. Here we see the direct concern of woman with life, which makes her an interpreter of life in what she does and is, and an inspirer rather than a creator of the arts. This outward direction of both man and woman towards the world constitutes, equally with their direction towards the other, the nature of man and of woman. Here, in the objective world they work out their relation and discover their nature. It is over life that man asserts himself and to it that woman submits, and through it that both authority and submission have meaning.

KATHLEEN BLISS.

Great Preachers—XVI. Joseph Butler

No one would claim for Bishop Butler, who died in June 1752, the title of "great preacher", if by that is meant either the possession of eloquence or the gift of evangelical appeal, yet it may safely be said that there is no preacher whose sermons are more constantly being read. Probably he is the only preacher whose sermons figure among the "set books" for examinations. The author of the *Analogy* chose to expound his theory of ethics in a series of sermons, and the first three of this series, preached in the Rolls Chapel, lay down the fundamental principles of his moral theory. This is not the place to consider the theory in detail, but it must be said that Butler's contribution to ethics is of first-rate importance and that he is likely long to remain among the authors who have the dubious privilege of being "required reading". The fact that a consideration of the basis of moral obligation stands in the forefront of his published discourses is no accident. It arises from the character of the man and the historical situation in which he lived. We know strangely little of the personality of Butler. There are few anecdotes which would throw light upon the impression which he made upon his contemporaries, but he was certainly a man who reverenced duty and cared for righteousness. Though he was far removed from that "enthusiasm" which the eighteenth century dreaded and despised, there is controlled passion in his sermons on Resentment, the Government of the Tongue and the Love of God. Butler was one who "lived ever in the great Taskmaster's eye". At the time when he wrote the critical spirit of the Age of Reason had begun to attack the accepted view of morality. The effects of Thomas Hobbes's scepticism had still to be encountered. Shaftesbury's speculation that morality was comparable with good taste had made a stir. The foundations of moral obligation were being debated. The whole of Butler's intellectual effort was directed towards defending Christian faith against the "rationalism" of the day. In the *Analogy* he refuted the Deists and attempted to vindicate Revelation; in the Sermons he defends Christian moral principles.

It is important, however, to notice that he moves within the same circle of ideas and presuppositions as his opponents. He accepts the appeal to reason. Though both in the *Analogy* and in the great sermon "Upon the Ignorance of Man" he insists upon the limitations of human knowledge, he never doubts that reason is to be the court of appeal or calls in an irrational authority to overthrow the conclusions of rational inquiry. It must be shown that it is reasonable to believe in Revelation. So in his treatment of the problem of ethics he seeks for a rational ground for the authority of conscience. Butler is regarded as one of the "intuitional" moralists, and no doubt correctly, since he asserts the existence of a faculty within man capable of judging actions, and that this faculty is the rightful guide and director in practical affairs, but he bases this claim for conscience on a rational argument and his contention is that it is reasonable to act in conformity with its dictates. Thus Butler can be ranged along with Kant as a rationalist in ethics. I do not think he would have objected to Kant's phrase "the practical reason" as a description of what he meant by conscience. At any rate, it is clear that for Butler conscience is not a faculty of feeling, as Shaftesbury held, but a faculty of judging.

In the "Sermons on Human Nature" Butler takes as his starting-point the doctrine of the Stoics that the good life is "life according to nature", but he attaches a meaning to the phrase which is not the same as the Stoics intended. While he does not deny that the good life may be, in some sense, one which is in harmony with the constitution of nature, he prefers to rest his case on the contention that it is a life according to the constitution of *human* nature. The heathen who, according to St Paul, without the law do by nature the things of the law are a law unto themselves in the sense that they have the guide and judge within. Butler can be said here again to have anticipated Kant; for he certainly holds that the moral life is "autonomous". When a man does right he is not bowing to an authority external to himself—he is reverencing "the moral law within". Thus Butler would not agree that moral insight and genuine virtue depend upon acceptance of any religious beliefs, though of course he would maintain that Christian faith is a powerful assistance in the life of goodness.

Human nature, Butler argues, from the point of view of practical activity, is constituted by several distinct elements. There are "particular passions", desires for particular objects, and there are "principles" which, to some extent, govern, restrain and harmonize the particular passions: Rational Self-love, Benevolence and Conscience. Each of these principles is superior to particular passions, because it is a principle of reason. Reasonable self-love is by no means to be regarded as evil; on the contrary, it is much to be wished that reasonable self-love were more powerful than it is—men's conduct would be far better than it is if they were sensibly selfish. Conscience is the faculty which can, if it is allowed, bring harmony into the working together of the elements which make up human nature. There is no point in asking how we know that Conscience is the rightful sove-

reign in the realm of the human personality; it bears the marks of authority in itself. No one, without a long course of doing violence to his nature, can wholly strip his conscience of its magisterial character. When we disobey it and strive to disregard it, we know that we are violating the true order of our being and disturbing the balance of our nature. There is no question of the authority of Conscience; the trouble is that it has not power equal to its authority; its might is not equivalent to its right. "Had it power as it has authority it would absolutely rule the world."

Even this brief and most inadequate sketch, which leaves out more than one point of considerable importance, will be sufficient to indicate that Butler did not give his hearers milk. Of course the other sermons are not on the same level of intellectual rigour, but all are closely reasoned and all of them presuppose the point of view which the first three sermons defined and defended. One cannot withhold a meed of admiration for the congregations which, presumably, listened at least without interruption to these discourses. Butler made no attempt to sugar the pill of ethical theory. There are no tricks of rhetoric, which he would have despised, there is hardly any appeal to the imagination or emotion. Who would venture to-day to begin a sermon thus: "The natural supremacy of reflection or conscience being thus established, we may from it form a distinct notion of what is meant by *human nature* when virtue is said to consist in following it and vice in deviating from it"? Yet there is every reason to believe that Butler was admired as a preacher, and anyone who takes the trouble to understand the problems which he is trying to solve will discover that these strange and dry dissertations have a fascination which causes him to read on and that he will remember them when other more superficially attractive sermons are forgotten.

The Age of Reason had its faults and limitations, but it seems that it really did believe in reason and liked to have its reason engaged in church. The idea that the churches were deserted in the eighteenth century is the opposite of the truth. They have rarely, if ever, been so full. To look at Hogarth's picture of the industrious apprentice "Fulfilling the Duties of a Christian" and observe the crowded church, with people of all classes present, is a salutary corrective to mistaken ideas about the Church in the time of Butler. No doubt one of the principal causes of Butler's reputation was his outstanding intellectual power. But the intellectual power was allied with the intellectual virtues. He is patently a man who is in search of truth. We are quite sure that he will never use an argument which he does not believe to be valid. He conveys the impression that he has seen all the difficulties. Many who have had this quality of intellectual integrity have lacked the ability to make their thought clear and coherent. This gift Butler had. Any difficulty which there may be in following his argument is due to the complexity of the subject and not to the exposition. The steps of the demonstration are arranged in orderly sequence, nor is there ever any doubt about the meaning of the terms which he uses. There is a satisfaction to the

mind in the logical unfolding of a theme and this lends interest and the power of holding the attention to a discourse.

We cannot claim for Butler that he is a master of English prose. In this respect he is not to be compared with that other philosophical bishop of the century, Berkeley, but he writes in a plain and exact style lighted up by pithy and memorable sentences, which can hardly be called epigrams because they are attempts to state shortly the exact truth—lapidary sentences. "Things are as they are and their consequences will be what they will be: why then should we seek to be deceived?" My favourite example of Butler's terse manner occurs in the sermon on the "Government of the Tongue": "Occasions for silence: when a man has nothing to say or nothing but what is better left unsaid."

Butler is misunderstood, however, if we suppose that he is merely an intellectual. He differs from his Deistic opponents chiefly in this that, whereas they abhorred mystery and thought that religion could be made perfectly clear, he is constantly aware of the profound mystery which surrounds life and the small degree in which the reason can illuminate it. He has no sympathy with the Deistic watchword "Christianity not mysterious". The conclusion of his sermon on the Ignorance of Man, with its emphasis on humility and adoration, hints to us of a depth in Butler's soul and experience which points beyond the rationalism of his time.

The famous meeting of Butler with John Wesley was the confrontation of two of the greatest men of the time. Neither understood the other. That was tragic, for it meant that evangelical zeal and intellectual power were not to be allied with one another. Who can say what the history of religion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would have been had these two streams not been sundered? We cannot but regret that the evangelical note is not more clear in Butler and wish that we had warmth from him as well as light, but let us not suppose that he has no message for to-day. Recently I read examination papers written by medical students for a prize which, in their medical school, was offered with Butler's *Analogy* as the subject. It was evident that Butler had set them thinking to some purpose and that they respected him for his intellectual power and honesty. Our days, when the foundations of faith and morals are called in question, are not unlike Butler's; we shall not serve the cause of the Christian faith effectively unless we can bring to our task the qualities which Butler possessed.

W. R. Matthews.

The Contemporary Interpretation of Suffering

Much simplified (but not, I suggest, over-simplified), the medieval interpretation of suffering may be said to have been governed by two factors: first, the obvious dependence of an agricultural civilization on the forces of nature, and hence on God; and, second, the belief that suffering was due primarily to man's sinfulness. As Thomas à Kempis said, "We would gladly be quiet and freed from all misery,

but seeing by sin we have lost our innocency, we have together with that lost also the true felicity."[1] Men were sinners, rejected God's will, did one another wrong, and brought revenge on their own heads. The consequent suffering was offered by God to each individual as a means to personal redemption: "Thou knowest what is expedient for my spiritual progress, and how greatly tribulation serves to scour off the rust of my sins."[2] The whole of human life was regarded as coming within the province of a moral law. The sanctions for this law included the threat of a fiery hell; but this fitted easily with the superstitions naturally arising in a civilization always and inescapably subject to the pressure of nature. As Kelsen has remarked, primitive man "finds himself in a bitter struggle with the dangers of nature. . . . It is easy to understand that he sees superhuman forces in this threatening world."[3] Hume made a similar observation 200 years earlier. In short, life in an agricultural society reinforced the sanctions and doctrines of the Church.

During the seventeenth century a long-prepared change of moral climate became conspicuous, particularly in such countries as England and Holland. The bourgeoisie, now townsmen for generations, had lost the primitive sense of direct dependence on nature; and with this their conception of their dependence on God changed. Increasingly too their circumstances fostered individual initiative and private enterprise. More sophisticated, less subject to the power of a ruling class, they became less tolerant of the authority of a centralized Church. Thus their economic activities won emancipation from the control of the Church; and underwent a displacement of aim from the service of God to the relief of man's estate, and eventually to the exploitation of natural resources. As Tawney puts it, "not sufficiency to the needs of daily life, but limitless increase and expansion, became the goal of the Christian's efforts",[4] "with its deification of the life of snatching to hoard, and hoarding to snatch".[5]

Parallel with the emancipation of commercial and industrial action occurred a similar emancipation of intellect. This was closely associated with the growth of science, as is shown by the writings of Bacon and the founders of the Royal Society ("The bonds of antiquity and authority . . . have so enchained the power of man, that he is unable, as if bewitched, to become familiar with things themselves"[6]); of their philosophical contemporaries, such as Spinoza; and of a revealing figure like Pascal, who had tasted both the emancipated outlook of science and intellectual obedience within the Church.

At the same time the moral law regarding personal relationships held its position, and with it the interpretation of suffering in terms of sin. Thus morality became divided, into one sphere of personal discipline and obedience to an absolute divine law, whether of the Church or of the Bible, and another sphere, of intellectual and busi-

[1] Thomas à Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ*, I, 22. [2] Ibid., III, 50.
[3] H. Kelsen, *Society and Nature*, p. 7 (Kegan Paul, 1946).
[4] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the rise of Capitalism*, Pelican edition, p. 223.
[5] Ibid., p. 253.
[6] Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Book I (Bohn's Scientific Library Edition, p. 418).

ness morality, subject to a law of very different type, that of individual adventure and achievement.

In the eighteenth century the split persisted. But now the difference in historical development between England and the rest of Europe produced a very considerable difference in outlook. In this country the alliance of aristocracy and bourgeoisie in the policy of moderation and compromise steadily gained strength. The moral law governing personal relationships, expressed in the very English quality of "good nature", Sir Tobie Matthew's "bottomless mine of pure gold",[1] was being translated into a moral law governing political relationships. We can see the feeling expressed in such maxims as these: To know when to let things alone is a high pitch of good sense; a rooted disease must be stroked away, rather than kicked away.[2]

Even when riddled by Hume's scepticism, the sense of moral law retained undisturbed the allegiance of the educated. Gibbon himself could write, "The first and indispensable requisite of happiness is a clear conscience";[3] and the sceptical Horace Walpole is evidently expressing deep convictions when he writes, "It was to the honour of Pope, that . . . though an idolator of their archfiend Bolingbroke and in awe of the malignant Swift, he never gave in to their venomous railings; railings against a man (Horace Walpole's father, Sir Robert) who, in twenty years, never attempted a stretch of power, did nothing but the common business of administration, and by that temperance and steady virtue, and unalterable good-humour and superior wisdom, baffled all the efforts of faction. . . ."[4]

Within this tradition the acceptance of suffering could remain strong—the conviction that troubles and frustrations formed an essential component of the pattern of life, whether caused by indeflectible necessity, or by a loving God; not to be evaded, nor to be circumvented by technology, but accepted. We can see the attitude expressed, not only in the writings of Christians but—in Stoic dress—in those of such sceptics as Gibbon and Walpole.

Under the sway of the new political tradition the attitude of acceptance gradually spread, both in the private world of the individual's dealings with his own fate and in the public world of politics and national affairs. Restraint and acceptance were becoming a characteristic feature of the culture pattern of the upper and professional classes; as can be seen very strikingly in the novels of Jane Austen and in the work of some of the Indian administrators of this period.

Thus the belief in the acceptance of pain and frustration remained a real moral force, a psychological or spiritual source of creative power, whether in action or contemplation. Its persistence ensured a succession of individuals capable, from their own experience and assimilation of suffering, of responding to the significance of the Cross. For in the crucifixion we see the complete acceptance by God of suffering caused by human sin, the model of our response to pain

[1] G. M. Trevelyan, *English Social History*, p. 251 (Longmans Green, 1942).
[2] H. Butterfield, *The Englishman and his History* (Cambridge, 1945), p. 90 (quoting Halifax). [3] E. Gibbon, *Autobiography*, Everyman edition, p. 180.
[4] Horace Walpole, *Letters*, 13 January 1780.

and frustration, and the proof of God's subordination of his power to his love. And unless we have had experience of the acceptance of suffering (and provided also that our belief in God is not of a kind to exclude the ideas of sin and redemption), we cannot take in the meaning of the Cross. Such assorted figures as Nelson, Wilberforce, and Newman, illustrate my point; Nelson for all his passion and charm was capable of writing in 1798: "I ought not to call what has happened to the Vanguard by the cold name of accident: I believe firmly that it was the Almighty's goodness to check my consummate vanity. I hope it has made me a better officer, as I feel confident it has made me a better man."[1]

On the Continent, however, the middle classes had never succeeded in establishing a satisfactory relationship to civil and religious authority, and the disaffected intellect had dissolved away more than the primitive and the superstitious sanctions for the moral law. Thus suffering was coming to be seen as the result of the action of a wicked ruling class or other section of the community. Hence the rise of, on the one hand, the resentment which rejected suffering and revolted against traditional authority, and on the other the Romantic idealism which identified the emancipation of subject classes with the achievement of Freedom and Brotherhood—see Schiller, Beethoven, the French Republic. Beethoven is a particularly interesting figure, as we seem to see in him a struggle between a Promethean and idealistic rebellion and the long agony of learning to accept his deafness, a struggle that reminds us of Milton's bitter conflict.

Thus at the beginning of the nineteenth century we see the educated classes of Europe freed to a considerable extent from a direct and obvious dependence on nature in regard to food and shelter, but those of England more generally disposed to regard the sphere of personal and political relationships as subject to a moral law.

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, science and technology made extraordinary advances, and not only the educated but all town-dwellers became emancipated from any sense of dependence on nature for the supply of primary needs. The petition "Give us this day our daily bread" entirely lost its primary meaning. In England the religious revival of the nineteenth century staved off the psychological consequences; but in the twentieth century they have come in with a bump, and even in this country God has come to appear remote from ordinary life. The countryside too is being invaded with the urban spirit. The control of nature has extended so far that the elimination of physical pain, disease, and malnutrition, has become a technical possibility: the pain of an amputation is banished by an anaesthetic; crop yields can be multiplied many times with a little extra skill. Many people have come to interpret "suffering" exclusively in terms of physical pain and want; as something that could be eliminated from human life by a planned deployment of scientific resources. The constant awareness that what counts is the individual's own ability and initiative makes it difficult even to understand the meaning of dependence on God.

[1] C. Mawson, *Portrait of England* (Penguin, 1942).

During the same period there has been a further decline, affecting this country since 1914, in the belief in a God-given moral law. Since the conviction of personal sin cannot persist without the conviction of an absolute obligation, there has been a corresponding weakening of the idea of human sinfulness: the acceptance of obligation, of the Law (in St Paul's language), accentuates the awareness of sin and the capacity for suffering (and of course also the capacity for deep satisfaction). Suffering is accordingly no longer interpreted in terms of sinfulness, as the result of what we human beings do to each other personally, the effect of envy, hatred and malice, and all uncharitableness.

Thus the two streams of influence coalesce, the growth in mastery over nature and the decline of belief in a transcendent spiritual reality. The emerging conception of suffering presents it, to the active reformer, either as a technical problem (like the conquest of small-pox) or as a political problem (like the defeat of Communism). In itself it has no meaning, no place in the pattern of life. It is something that never ought to occur, something that only goes on happening because wicked vested interests will not allow the technicians to get busy, or because a wicked ruling class is holding on to power. Such ideas can lead to nothing but resentment, frustration and violence. To the plain small man suffering, whether due to war or slump or private misfortune, is just perplexity, bewilderment, anxiety. He has no clear creed that makes sense of his troubles; very often he has no firm community to fall back on. Unable to bear his fate alone, as the tough existentialist tells him he ought, he lapses into a craving for mass conformity, even at the price of submission to a dictator, or for sensational entertainment; or he succumbs to a peptic ulcer or another of the psychosomatic ailments which have spread so rapidly in the last hundred years.

How, then, do we stand in this country in 1952? There are three favourable features in the situation. In the first place I would suggest that the now long-accepted tradition of political restraint, together with the religious revival of the last century, has permitted a relatively healthy social evolution and prevented the growth of class bitterness which has nourished Communism in other countries. Secondly, the closely linked tradition of the cheerful acceptance of distress and hardship ("grin and bear it", cracking a joke in a tight spot) is still strong and fruitful. Thirdly, the tradition of personal neighbourliness and mutual forbearance also remains vigorous, and this social solidarity in itself cushions the reactions to pain and perplexity.

On the other hand there is the dark side to the picture. For one thing, various social conditions—the atomization of communities in cities, the strangling of individual responsibility in large corporations, the acceleration of social change—are threatening the third strand of tradition mentioned above. Secondly, as I have described in detail in this article, the mastery of nature has led to a gradual fading of the sense of dependence on, and need for, God. Consequently people tend both to over-rate the self-sufficiency of man and

to feel dependent on the selfishness or unselfishness of other classes or nations of men. And thirdly, the belief in a transcendent spiritual reality and God-given law has become confused and attenuated. The awareness of sin is therefore weaker, and the interpretation of suffering as due to sin correspondingly withered. Hence we are less capable of recognizing the significance of the Cross and seeing in it the answer to our frustration.

What prospects does the future hold? First we need a great deepening of belief in God among professing Christians, one condition of which is the genuine assimilation of scientific assumptions and methods into Christian thought. Otherwise the ideas of sin and redemption cannot be widely revived.

Secondly, the question arises whether a recurrence of serious economic emergency, coupled with prolonged or acute hardship and a further whittling away of our tradition of neighbourliness, might not cripple our habits of restraint and endurance and cause a fierce flaring up of bitterness and resentment. As against this, it might be argued that, given no further decline of our native traditions, a protracted threat from Communism, with revolutionary disturbances in other parts of the world, might well serve (as seems to have happened in the period from 1790 to 1830) as the challenge to a fresh burst of life and conviction in this country.

K. G. Collier.

The Historical Element in the Gospel: A Discussion of Emil Brunner

There have been many sharp changes in religious thought in recent years, notably where the reaction against the rationalistic idealism of the last century is concerned. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the new emphasis on the historical character of the Christian revelation. Importance was indeed accorded to history in the nineteenth century, the idea of evolution being combined with the idealism of Hegel to yield metaphysical views in which the notion of inevitable progress reinforced the somewhat complacent confidence of the age. But this tended to centre attention mainly on some consummation of processes in the future which entirely superseded the past and made it irrelevant. Nor was it easy to accord to particular events any significance not derived from the general patterns imposed upon them. But we fight shy of bold assertions about the course of history to-day, and the shattering experiences of two world wars, with all the ensuing confusion, have made us less inclined to seek for a simple clue to the multifarious events in which we are immersed. We are not so certain that there is *a* meaning of history in the sense of some one intelligible comprehensive plan or pattern which we ourselves can see to be steadily fulfilled in the course of history. At the same time we are also less disposed to look for exhaustive explanations of human existence on the plane of mere his-

torical events. Humanism is largely out of favour in religious quarters, the emphasis being rather on the idea of transcendence and of the impact upon us in religious experience of forces which are in some way alien or "wholly other", in the common theological terms of to-day. There is a mystery in religion which we can never hope to dispel, since God, and not man, is the centre of religion. But while this discourages attempts to reduce the religious hope to the dimensions of some temporal utopia or to find some completely self-explanatory principle in history itself, it extends to the varied events of history the possibility of being religiously significant in other ways than as stages in the fulfilment of some goal by which they are wholly superseded. A new sense of that "given" element in all experience which cannot be exhaustively rationalized turns attention likewise to history as the medium or embodiment of religious truth which could not be apprehended in any other way. "Revelation in history" becomes therefore a theme of outstanding importance in religious controversy to-day. Some theologians emphasize the transcendent side of religion so strongly as to obscure altogether the new significance which the very emphasis on transcendence lends to historical facts, while others present us with some kind of "religious history" which is largely divorced from all that history normally means for us. Few come boldly to terms with the history they elevate so much, and it is against the background of the general failure to do this that the recent work of Emil Brunner, entitled *The Scandal of Christianity*, can best be appraised.

In the course of this book, which consists of five *Robertson Lectures* delivered in Glasgow in 1948, Brunner finds the essential scandal of Christianity in the invitation, as he puts it, "to be bound to something which happened once". He maintains that the intellectual leaders of our time find the "intricate connexion in traditional Christian faith with past history, with a personality and certain happenings of far-away times, superfluous and embarrassing. They agree with Fichte: "it is not the historical but the metaphysical alone which saves". Brunner therefore sets himself to show why the historical element is so important in religion.

The main consideration adduced for this purpose is "the irrational fact of our sin". Brunner urges repeatedly that the "guilty perversion of what ought to be is an undeniable irrational fact". And I believe most religious thinkers would readily concede him this. But on this basis Brunner straightway concludes that there must also be an "irrational givenness" in religious revelation which must, for this reason, take the form of a historical event. Even if we could have some natural knowledge of God in a primeval situation prior to the Fall, this is no longer possible; for we are no longer in God's order of creation. "Sin means that we have created a new situation, an historical and irrational situation", and the way God proposes to deal with this situation can only be known from within it. As Brunner also puts this matter: "Just as sin has happened, so forgiveness must happen." It is also pointed out that many "religions of immediacy", as Brunner calls the religions which do not stress his-

torical revelation, have little place for the ideas of guilt and forgiveness of sin.

Now I think Brunner is quite right in stressing the ultimacy of human guilt and the need for forgiveness. To have brought these ideas into prominence, and rebutted the naturalistic interpretation of them, is a major achievement of the school of theologians to which he belongs. But the way he conceives the relation between this and the need for historical revelation seems to me far from clear.

In the first place, it is not certain whether he regards our sinfulness as pointing to a need for a historical revelation or finds in revelation the proof of our sinfulness. He is certainly loath to admit that we can know anything of guilt apart from the revelation of God's forgiveness of it, and he assures us, in his own words: "When we as Christians say that only by an intervention of God, by his creating a new situation, can communion with God be established, we recognize that a breach between God and man does exist." One finds it hard to avoid the impression of a vicious circle here similar to Brunner's insistence in earlier writings that the knowledge of evil which makes us guilty comes only with the intervention of the grace which heals us.

But the main difficulty I find in Brunner's view is that he seems to ascribe the need for revelation in history solely to our sinfulness. This seems to by-pass a major problem, and one of crucial importance at present—namely, the properly epistemological problem of how it is possible for man, being finite, to know God who is infinite or transcendent. This problem is complicated by sin, but it cannot be reduced altogether to the problem of the cure of sin. There are other problems in the relation of God and man than those expressly created by our wickedness; and may it not be that there is something in the nature of all communication of God to man which links it with historical events? It is certainly not in the moral life alone that God has dealings with us. These reflections, moreover, enable us to look outside a particular tradition such as the Judaeo-Christian one for some manifestations of God's activity in history. Brunner is most reluctant to do this, he will not admit any revelation of God in other religions than Christianity. He is likewise driven to conceive of the Christian revelation too rigidly in terms of dogmatic formulations of religious truth. A "historical revelation" he expressly identifies with "dogmatic religion". But this seems to give the priority to formal doctrinal ideas at the expense of the varied experiences and happenings to which they are related. The insistence on the historical character of revelation seems here to lack the courage of its conviction.

The contempt with which Brunner really views the ordinary course of history and human activity appears especially in his own accounts of that very sinfulness to which he himself accords such importance in his discussion of revelation. For his view of sin is far removed from all that we normally mean by it. On the one hand he insists that "the kernel of man's being is responsibility, responsibility is the essence of humanity"; and with this estimate, although somewhat exaggerated, I have no serious quarrel. I also fully agree with Brunner that moral

evil is more radical than the presence in us of animal instincts which education alone suffices to control. Moral evil involves deliberate choice and rebellion, and this is what makes it, in Brunner's own words, a "dismal sinister phenomenon". But it is just here that Brunner's account of sin fails us. He affirms "that man *in his reality* is in contradiction to the will of God and to his own destiny and being". It is not merely "that man *can* sin, but that man *has become* a sinner. Not this or that man," it is added, "but man as such." The "situation" of man is sinful, and this notion is bound up with the notion of "a totality and unity of all men in sin". As Brunner also puts this, "there is a solidarity of all men in sin", "the whole of humanity is a unity in its sin", "men in their sin stand in an indissoluble connection". For every individual is "in an incomparable, unique way also the whole of humanity". For this reason (Brunner continues) "sin is a deed for which we are responsible" and also "our being which we are unable to get out of". "I know", Brunner declares, "that I am responsible for my sin and cannot put the blame on God's creation. But at the same time my sin, which is also the sin of everyone else, is something from which I cannot disentangle myself. I cannot make myself such a one as I know I ought to be, or as I am destined to be by divine creation. I am a fallen creature, prisoner of his own godlessness. And I am this as member of a fallen humanity. No moral or religious endeavour or exertion can get me out of this condition, just because it is I myself who am affected by sin, not merely a part of me." Such are Brunner's views, and they seem to me very wide of the mark. Can we really hold anyone responsible for anything he has not wittingly and freely chosen? Moral sense seems to say that we cannot, and if moral sense is right and theologians are wrong in speaking of a solidarity of all men in their sin (as seems to me certainly the case), then we cannot begin to understand the true situation of man, or the need for grace and the meaning of it, until we revise radically the traditionalist conception of human evil to which Brunner is firmly wedded. To speak of "man as such" is the best way of emptying the varied colourful course of history of genuine significance, and it is just because he is so prone to do that (in my view) that Brunner is unable to do justice to the positive evidence of revelation in the actual experience of individuals.

It is worth noting here also the attitude Brunner adopts towards the bearing of historical criticism on the authenticity of the gospel records. He rightly notes that "all protests of fundamentalism are vain". But he tends to go to the other extreme in admitting the "fragmentary and precarious" character of our records and "the uncertainty of historical knowledge" about Jesus. His view seems to be that faith provides us with the certainty we need. But does this mean that it is faith which provides the warrant for the facts on which faith itself is based? I incline to think that this is Brunner's view. He assures us at least that "the certainty of faith lies on another plane than the secular certainty of historical facts". Now, it is true that faith illumines the facts, and that mere historical knowledge will not give us the Gospel. But we can surely not dispense altogether with

a good measure of independent historical certainty, even if faith is needed in some ways to extend it. I should say that it is in the picture of Jesus which emerges from the Biblical records that faith has its birth. This still leaves us with a very hard problem of the nature of faith and its relation to fact. But the point I wish most to make now is that few of the distinctive claims made on behalf of Christianity seem to survive if the independent credibility of the substance of the Gospel records is in doubt. Even to suggest that this is not the case, or to show lack of deep concern about the problem, is a very peculiar way of rehabilitating the historical character of Christian revelation.

There is one other feature of this book which helps us to view Brunner's achievement here and elsewhere in the right perspective. For he makes it unusually plain that he considers the idea of a transcendent God to be itself one we could know only through revelation. The philosophical idea of God, he argues, cannot give us the Lord God, Creator of the Universe. For it makes God himself a term in a relation and dependent in some way on the world from which he is known. And this is certainly true of many philosophical accounts of religion, especially the idealistic ones that Brunner has mainly in mind. But the philosophical argument for the existence of God cannot be properly presented in any form other than that which posits a wholly transcendent God.

It is their appreciation of this point that lends its special significance and timeliness to neo-Thomist accounts of the existence of God, such as we find in Dr Mascall's excellent study *Existence and Analogy*. Due appreciation of these matters, furthermore, helps us to see how the transcendence of God calls directly for a revelation that is given in particular facts of experience, independently of complications wrought by sin. This would need much time to sustain properly. But the suggestion I wish to make is that it is in his disrespect for philosophy, and a consequent failure of philosophical understanding, that Brunner fails to do justice to his own best insights. This applies not only to his main theme of the historical character of revelation, but also to much else which he vividly puts before us—his account of the "holy wrath" of God, for example, and "the miracle of God's mercy". Again and again we feel that what Brunner and others of his school have to say awakens deep responsive chords. In some sense he seems dead right and prophetic in his insight, in another he is not. There is something amiss in the presentation of his main ideas. And the reason for this, I believe, is that he and other discerning theologians have not got beyond the point of providing the materials on which religious thought must get to work to-day. Much sifting is needed, but the material itself is of so rich a nature that the opportunity for an imaginative philosophy of religion seems greater to-day than at any other time. It seems within our power to supersede the great syntheses of the past if acute analysis and construction match the visionary insight of the theologians.

H. D. Lewis.

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BOOK REVIEWS

IN MEMORIAM ERNST LOHMEYER. Edited by Werner Schmauch. Evangelisches Verlagswerk, Stuttgart. DM 18.50.

It is a well-known German custom to present a volume of essays to a professor on his sixtieth birthday. This book was intended to be such a *Festgabe,* but before it could be published in 1951 suspicions were confirmed that Lohmeyer had died in captivity five years before. He had been arrested just before the reopening of Greifswald University, of which he had been appointed Rektor. His political record was above suspicion, for he had been deposed from the Rektorship of Breslau in 1935 by the Nazis. The *Festgabe* had to be an "In Memoriam".

As a New Testament specialist, Lohmeyer's chief claim to fame rests upon his theory of Christian origins first expounded in his *Galiläa und Jerusalem* (1936) and developed further in subsequent publications. Seeking to explain the mystery of the existence of divergent traditions about the resurrection appearances, one locating them in Galilee and the other in Jerusalem, Lohmeyer concluded that from the beginning there had existed two different Christian communities, or at least two distinct tendencies within Christianity. One was centred upon Galilee, and its traditions are mainly enshrined in Matthew and Mark; the other was centred on Jerusalem and is represented by the Lucan writings. The Galilean Christians, led by James, the Lord's brother, remained true to the Jewish law, lived in poverty and Nazirite asceticism, but, so far from being exclusively Judaistic, pursued an active missionary policy towards their non-Jewish neighbours in Galilee. Their Christology was expressed in terms of the Son of Man, the Servant and Kyrios. Of the Jerusalem Church Lohmeyer has less to tell us, but this was led by the Twelve, was less actively engaged in missionary endeavours, and expressed its Christology in terms of the "Messiah". This theory enables Lohmeyer to turn the tables on the form-critics by establishing a Palestinian origin for those elements in the synoptic Christology which they would assign to Hellenistic influence. It is difficult, however, to reconcile this theory with the agreement between Acts and St Paul, that all the Christian leaders were originally Galileans and all converged on Jerusalem, including James (Gal. 1. 19). Any disciples who may have been left behind in Galilee were not of sufficient importance for Paul to pay them special attention (contrast Gal. 2. 1). Nor is there any difference of meaning between the "Messiah" Christology and the

"Son of Man" and Servant traditions. All have been reinterpreted to become the vehicles for the one new Event of Jesus Christ. The Jerusalem tradition *was* the Galilean tradition, for it was brought thither from Galilee. This theory, moreover, while it was safe enough in the hands of Lohmeyer, can, as we shall see from some of the contributions to *In Memoriam*, be exploited in the interests of far more tendentious speculations.

The first contribution to the volume is a posthumous essay from Lohmeyer himself on Matt. 28. 16–20. This pericope is not an editorial composition, but a genuine primitive Galilean tradition. If the evidence of Eusebius be followed, and the threefold name omitted, we get a rhythmical verse form. It is not a resurrection appearance, but a revelation of the exalted Son of Man. This is brilliantly suggestive. May it not be that our conception of the post-resurrection events has been unduly coloured by the Lucan writings, and that the earliest traditions about them—1 Cor. 15. 1–8; Mark 14. 28 and 16. 7—imply "Parousia visions" rather than "resurrection appearances"?

Of the other essays in this book, two are in English. "Jesus and First Century Galilee", by Sherman E. Johnson, is an example of the tendentious exploitation of Lohmeyer's theory. Johnson finds that certain genuine primitive Galilean traditions in the synoptic gospels establish the non-Messianic character of the original history: "These old Galilean materials exhibit [Jesus] as speaking with full prophetic authority and independence, but they do not clearly identify him either as the eschatological or the suffering Son of Man." The second English contribution is from Dr R. H. Lightfoot, who expands some points in a chapter of his *Gospel Message of St Mark*.

Of the German essays, that by Hellmut Gollwitzer on Luther's and Zwingli's exegesis of John 6 is of special interest in the light of recent discussions on Cranmer's Eucharistic doctrine, and is remarkably close to the treatment of Zwingli in a recent pamphlet published in America by C. C. Richardson entitled *Zwingli and Cranmer on the Eucharist*. If, as it seems we must, we are to call Cranmer a Zwinglian, we must know what we do mean and what we do not mean by that, and what precisely are the deficiencies of that doctrine of the Eucharist. And the last word on the subject has not been said by Dom Gregory Dix.

Another example of the subversive exploitation of Lohmeyer's theory is Gerhard Sass's essay on "The Apostles in the Didache". In the original Galilean tradition the apostles were charismatic figures quite distinct from the Twelve. It was a later Jerusalem tradition which extended the title of apostle to the Twelve, made the apostle the authoritative witness of the events from John the Baptist to the resurrection appointed by the risen Christ, and finally restricted the title of apostle to the Twelve. Surely, however, the Pauline writings make it abundantly clear that, except for the final stage of restricting the apostolate to the Twelve, the supposedly later Jerusalem development is present in the earliest evidence we have about the nature of an apostle (1 Cor. 15. 1–9, cf. 9. 1). The passages cited by

Sass in favour of a charismatic origin for the apostolate (1 Cor. 12. 28; Eph. 4. 11) are not speaking of their origin at all, but of their function in the one body. While Lohmeyer's theory can throw valuable light on the resurrection narratives, it can, when applied as a general principle, be exploited for tendentious purposes, and may even evoke the long-laid ghost of Ferdinand Christian Baur.

REGINALD H. FULLER.

LAMPETER.

A STUDY OF MAN-WOMAN RELATIONSHIP. A Study Outline. S.C.M. Press. 1s.

THE SERVICE AND STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE CHURCHES. By Kathleen Bliss. S.C.M. Press. 12s. 6d.

One of the most important though not spectacular movements of contemporary thought is concerned with the meaning of sex—that is, with the meaning of manhood and womanhood, and with the status and destiny of man and woman in society. This is a question altogether different from that of the emancipation of women. The emancipation movements (for there have been several during the course of history) were generally and properly concerned with the removal of injustices and disabilities, but ironically enough they based their feminism upon the Aristotelian assumption that the male is the human norm, and so claimed for women the right and the freedom to do as men. It seems never to have occurred to anyone to inquire into the significance of sexual differentiation; rather, that was something to be ignored, and as far as possible transcended or even obliterated. Perhaps, however, the feeling that emancipation has not given woman what she needs has served to stimulate thought along other and ultimately more profitable lines, and to encourage an attempt to assess one of the great social revolutions of our time in terms of the fundamental issues involved.

Here, as elsewhere, secular thinkers have been first in the field, but a Commission of the World Council of Churches has been considering the whole question of the life and work of women in the Church, which was first discussed at the Amsterdam Assembly of 1948, and out of the deliberations of this Commission these two very different but equally important publications have emerged. The first, as its preface makes clear, is "a study outline of matters which, in the view of the Commission, need discussion", and the findings and comments of specialized groups are invited. The social, political, and scientific aspects of the question are briefly set out, and in themselves afford much valuable material for discussion, but it is clear that the central and critical point is theological. Here the basis of the inquiry must obviously be the Biblical account of the creation of mankind in the "image" of God, and use is made of the penetrating insights of the third volume of Barth's *Kirchliche Dogmatik* into the "di-unity" of humanity. The "total Man" or Adam (Gen. 5. 2) is neither male nor female in isolation, but man and woman in union, and particularly relational union in marriage. The implications of

this new and profound view of man are great and far-reaching—for the Church no less than for society at large, and it is in this context that Dr Kathleen Bliss's book must be studied.

The greater part of this book consists of factual but none the less fascinating accounts of what women are doing in and for the Church, voluntarily and professionally, in ministry and government. These accounts are based on reports furnished by Christian bodies from every part of the world, and one's first reaction on closing the book is admiration for the skill with which Dr Bliss has handled her mass of material and woven it into so readable a survey. For most readers, the next reaction will be one of humble astonishment at the range and variety of the work which women are doing and have done for the faith, coupled with a sense of shame that it is often so little valued. The way in which, during the war, women carried on the work and in many cases the full ministry of their churches under enemy occupation will provoke unstinted admiration—but not the sequel: "As soon as women were not needed theological arguments against their ministry were strongly voiced. . . ." This is written of East Germany in particular, but it may well make others than Lutherans feel uncomfortable.

Once again the problem of the ministry of women is raised, not, this time, as an ecclesiastical question only, but as one which involves consideration anew and with greater theological insight of the place of man and woman as complementary elements of humanity in the creative and redemptive purpose of God. Both the study outline and Dr Bliss in her last chapter indicate some of the lines along which inquiry must proceed, but there can be no quick or easy solution. Perhaps what is needed most of all is willingness to carry the discussion forward humbly, realistically, and adventurously, and the courage to challenge many of the irrational and discreditable prejudices which disfigure the traditional approach to the question of woman's place and destiny in society. In this, these two publications will play a valuable part, and it is to be hoped that they are only the forerunners of other exploratory Christian studies in this neglected field.

SHERWIN BAILEY.

BIRMINGHAM.

DR LEE OF LAMBETH. A Chapter in Parenthesis in the History of the Oxford Movement. By Henry R. T. Brandreth. S.P.C.K. 21s.

We are grateful to Mr Brandreth for having written this scholarly and well-documented life of Dr Lee. Lee, because of his part in the Association for the Promotion of the Unity of Christendom, is a figure of peculiar interest in the second stage of the Tractarian Movement. The Association, which was founded in 1857 by Lee and Bishop Forbes of Brechin on the Anglican side, and de Lisle and A. W. Pugin on the Roman side, received the support of a large number of Anglicans and Roman Catholics as well as of Orthodox clergy. Its

only obligation was a common daily prayer for union, yet it was condemned at Rome in 1864. Pusey, Keble, and Isaac Williams kept entirely aloof from the Association.

Lee was famous in his earlier days not only as a worker for reunion, but as a powerful and eloquent preacher, an author of considerable ability, a faithful pastor in one of the poorest districts of South London, a pioneer of a dignified ceremonial—a ceremonial, it was said, with "something of Dr Lee in it"—and a notable champion of the Catholic character of the Church of England. In 1877 there came a change, when he practically repudiated the Anglican position. In that year he founded the Order of Corporate Reunion, the members of which were "bound by a solemn pledge that he administered" to them not to speak or write about it save to fellow members. Mr Brandreth has gathered together in a fascinating chapter all that can be discovered about this mysterious organization. The object of the Order seems to have been to bring about reunion by giving conditional reordination to clergy of the Church of England. For this purpose it would appear that F. G. Lee, T. W. Mossman, and Thomas Seccombe, were consecrated bishops in or near Venice (some said "on the high seas") by three shadowy prelates whose names have never been divulged. Mr Brandreth's comment on these strange proceedings is of great interest—"it is possible that Cardinal Mai, whose name was constantly whispered as being concerned in the conspiracy, did persuade the Pope to turn a pontifical blind eye" to what was being done. Lee subsequently regretted the part he had played in these extraordinary events, which separated him from most of his former friends. He was received into the Church of Rome on his deathbed. Space prevents further comment on a book which is packed full of interest from start to finish.

R. D. Middleton.

Oxford.

They shall be My People. 2 vols and a handbook for teachers. By a Religious of the C.S.M.V. Oxford University Press. 10s. each volume.

The O.U.P. has devoted two handsome volumes and a handbook to this series of thirty-seven plays. They are not plays to be acted, but to be read aloud as a medium of teaching. They traverse the Bible from Abraham to the Apocalypse and are meant to show the single, unified pattern which an enlightened theology finds in that unwieldy mass of material; which is to say that they tackle the most important theological problem of our day, the exposition in the light of modern knowledge and modern theological understanding of the great God-enacted drama which is the substance of the Christian message and the groundwork of the Church's liturgy. The author knows that her task requires her to incorporate a historical perspective into her exposition, though at the same time she must preserve the proper stylized and thematic relationship between different events in the story; she chooses wisely the tie-rods to bind together

her many playlets into one overarching drama; and she puts across unmistakably the important teaching that the theme of the Bible is the Chosen People. In fact she makes a timely contribution to the deeper and wider understanding of what the Spirit is saying to the Churches to-day.

Perhaps the balance between history and patterning which these plays try to maintain is overweighted on the side of history. The story of the Fall, for instance, is avoided, presumably because it is not history, though it has a quite essential place in the Bible pattern. Much, on the other hand, is anxiously claimed for history that is only doubtfully its due. A similar naivety overlooks the sardonic element in the Old Testament. Solomon, it is true, receives his measure of irony, and Ezra gets a definite snub; but the author shows little understanding of the extent to which Jesus contradicted Judaism even while he fulfilled it. Again, it is possible that a more sophisticated understanding of the Bible would have left out the old attempt to synthesize the Synoptic Gospels and John into a single, consistent story—as though one should make a harmony of Hamlet and the sources Shakespeare used in writing it in order to come at the true history of the Prince of Denmark! One of the chief merits of this undertaking is that its breadth and scope invite the opening up of such fundamental problems of Biblical interpretation.

But why did the author of this praiseworthy attempt choose to use the most banal art-form available—the slangy dialogue of the parish play? There is a certain puerility in the presentation of these plays which quarrels violently with the greatness of the meaning they embody.

Philip J. Lamb.

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SHORTER NOTICES

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Religions. By E. Royston Pike. Allen and Unwin. 30s.

It takes a brave man to set about compiling an encyclopaedia of religion in 400 pages. Yet Mr Royston Pike has set about the task; and the result is, on the whole, an interesting book within its limits. The compiler has with some success done his "best to cultivate the art of the expositor rather than that of the apologist or of the critic", and states that "in the majority of cases the articles have been submitted for authoritative consideration and expert revision". Thus, Anglicans have advised on Anglican matters, Nonconformists on Nonconformist, Hindus on Hindu. Mr Pike does not, however, acknowledge advice from a Roman Catholic authority, nor can one discover whether the entry on Jehovah's Witnesses was submitted to a leader of that body for "expert revision".

Generally the entries appear accurate as far as they go; but they are necessarily brief, and rarely do more than skim the surface. There are two serious criticisms of the book. One is that the amount

of space devoted to some relatively unimportant subjects is disproportionately large, while some important subjects are treated in a few lines. For example, Joanna Southcott has a longer entry than Moses, Lao-Tsu, or St Augustine. Indeed, the founders of obscure sects have received favourable treatment. The present Archbishop of Canterbury who is given five lines, Dr Garbett who has eight, and Miss Dorothy Sayers who has eleven, must be left to judge for themselves whether they approve of finding themselves in such company, or in an encyclopaedia of religion at all. The other criticism is that many obvious persons and subjects have been omitted, e.g. Descartes, Freemasonry, Hegel, F. D. Maurice, F. Max-Müller, Mana, Monolatry, to take a random sample. But it would have been surprising had there been no such omissions: it is remarkable that so much has been included.

This kind of book has its fascination, and must be the result of great industry: it invites us to fill in the idle moment by turning over its pages to learn a little about almost forgotten things in the vast phenomenon we designate "religion". It is essentially a book of information: you pay your money (thirty shillings) and you take your choice. But you must expect from it no guidance as to what or how to choose.

D. W. Gundry.

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The Church of the New Testament. By L. G. Champion. Carey Kingsgate. 7s. 6d.

The Way, the Truth and the Life. By Sybil M. Bicester. Mowbray. 3s.

The first is a straightforward book, written without undue technicality. It provides a summary, always methodical and informative, of much New Testament material. The writer's forthright argument for the baptism of "believers only" should remind us all of the wide divergences in our midst, divergences that may well have to continue through our coming reunion. One may compare the point of view here expressed with that not only of Anglicans but also of such theologians as Principal Micklem (see Theology, July 1940, p. 7) or Dr Whale (*Christian Doctrine*, p. 165), where great significance is given to infant baptism as underlining God's initiative in man's redemption. The further point is made that "The Church" means primarily "The Fellowship". ". . . Jesus called twelve men 'to be with him'." This is important. One of the best things in the book is the writer's simple imaginative reconstruction of what that fellowship meant. But why go on to say "The appointment of the disciples was not a . . . way of extending his ministry or an embryo organization by which his ministry might be carried on in the future"? The answer perhaps lies in the writer's discussion of the relationship of Church and Kingdom, where he refuses to have the Church described as an instrument to achieve a coming Kingdom. Surely our

doctrine of the Kingdom, and so of the Church, must be partly conditioned by the amount of evil still to be fought in the world?

In *The Way, The Truth and The Life* we have the deepest convictions of a sensitive, liberal and Christian soul. The book starts with one of those always moving stories of an invalid who allows her sufferings to be used in a truly redemptive manner. The author's thoughts on this set the pattern for the book. It is not a rigid pattern, but it is an ancient one: the mystery of our salvation, the secret of true knowledge, the need for service. The style is reflective. A reference to Berdyaev as "perhaps the greatest theologian of our day" will betray the nature of the writer's approach. One example must suffice. On Christian conversion she quotes "a modern German divine" as follows: "Man needs a double conversion. The first takes him from the everyday world to the spiritual, the second brings him back from the spiritual into the everyday world." But the thought had probably been absorbed from Berdyaev long before. "The new piety is the road not only from the world and man to God, but the reverse, from God to man" (p. 128 of *The Fate of Man*, 1935). There is indeed, throughout, a notable blend of the prophetic and the sacramental: no merely illiberal theology of crisis, yet no theology of sanctification without transfiguration and redemption. There is here a great deal in a small compass.

Cecil Hargreaves.

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Congregational Praise. Independent Press. 18s. 6d.
I'll Praise My Maker. By Erik Routley. Independent Press. 15s.

Congregational Praise is a new hymn book issued by the Congregational Union of England and Wales. It is an excellent compilation. The editors have proceeded with prudence and moderation in their revision of the previous *Congregational Hymnary*. A list of hymns which it was suggested might be omitted was published in *The Christian World*. There followed a considerable correspondence concerning the merits and demerits of these hymns, and as a result a number of them have been retained in the new book. This sane, practical method in revision has resulted in a remarkably well-balanced book. It is particularly noteworthy for the fine selection of hymns by the great classical Evangelical hymn writers such as Wesley, Watts, Montgomery, Cowper, Newton, and Doddridge, hymns soundly doctrinal and scriptural, which can not only teach but inspire. An equal wisdom has been shown in the selection of suitable tunes: where new tunes are offered, they are most often accompanied by the old familiar ones as an alternative. This is a hymn book which should satisfy, and prove acceptable to worshippers.

Erik Routley, one of the editors of *Congregational Praise,* has written a book about the hymns of the Evangelical writers, who stand in the tradition of English Calvinism. He is obviously a master of his subject, and discusses and appraises in the most delightful manner

the hymns of Doddridge, Cowper, Newton, Watts, Montgomery, and others less known. His numerous and judicious quotaitons from the lesser-known hymns of these writers are particularly helpful, and make us realize how much our books could be enriched by the addition of some of these hymns.

O. R. Clarke.

Liverpool.

The Christian Mission. By Max Warren. S.C.M. Press. 7s. 6d.
The Approach to Christian Unity. Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge. Heffer. 4s.
What the Church of England Stands For. By the Bishop of London. Mowbrays. 7s. 6d.

These three books are bracketed for review; they are mutually complementary. Dr Warren's book is primarily an outstanding attempt to help Christian people to assess correctly the whole modern world situation, which has led to the quickly changing and critical moment in world history in which we find ourselves. It is a moving book and will lend itself to use by study groups; there are many quotations from modern theologians, but one is left wondering whether there is here elucidated a general theological point of view which might serve as the basis of a forward movement in the Mission of the Church to the world in our age. It is reassuring to find a plea for a wholeness of approach towards missionary, social, political, and economic problems. In intention the author wishes to be realistic and avoid any suspicion of Docetism, but one wonders whether there is here a theology of the Church which can secure what the author is aiming at. Thus one of the main points in the argument is that in the Christian Mission there stands between the Church and the Individual what the author calls "the Group". Now, in the Bible the Family is the primary Group, but the New Testament never seems to speak of the Family as a fixed group inside the Church; a brother can be a Christian while his Sister is still a pagan. In the New Testament the society of the Church aims at the full development of each individual, while the end of each member of the Church is the advancement of the society of the Church. To idolize the Group might well lead to a kind of ecclesiastical syndicalism; a group might seek to obtain the unity and drive from the special things it does together, rather than from the relation to God in Christ which sustains the Church as such. We all know the controversy about Group action in connexion with missionary work.

However, the author gets beyond the Group idea when he writes (81–84), with power, about the fact that the Church acts at "several levels of intensity". I cannot think that the treatment of Communism on pp. 26–32 is saisfactory; the idea of "God in Politics" seems to need greater clarification than it receives. Further, I am not sure that the words "Christian Mission" are not sometimes used in this book as if they were an adequate description of the Church, as if Kerygma is the whole New Testament Gospel and that Didache is

not equally important. The Church is certainly sent with a message, but there is something ontological about the Church, which has always to be trying *to be* her real self. But these few remarks only show how much there is in this valuable book; it will be most useful and inspiring as a study circle textbook.

The second book under review is *The Approach to Christian Unity*; here are collected nine sermons preached before the University of Cambridge, with a Preface by the Vice-Chancellor. Four sermons are by members of Ecclesia Anglicana (Professor Norman Sykes, the Rev. M. B. Dewey, Dean of Pembroke, the Bishop of Chichester, and the Bishop of Brechin): there are single sermons by Bishop Cassian of the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Paris; the Rev. Dr Newton Flew, Principal of Wesley College, Cambridge; the Rev. Professor R. D. Whitehorn of Westminster College, Cambridge; the Rev. Dr N. Micklem of Mansfield College, Oxford; and the Rev. Dr E. A. Payne, now the Secretary of the Baptist Union of Great Britain. The book is full of interest, because each sermon expresses those aspects of the problem of Church reunion which appeal most forcibly to people who can fairly be held to be representative of various Christian traditions. A perusal of this book forces on one's mind two conclusions: (*a*) the great progress that has been made in the ecumenical movement as the result of "speaking the truth in love" to each other over a period of forty years now; (*b*) the outstanding need to-day for clear heads and penitent and patient hearts. It would not be seemly to discuss in these columns the sermons by those outside the Anglican tradition; each sermon should be read in its wholeness and each has something of great value to teach us all. It is well that all Anglicans should study carefully the statesman-like remarks of the Bishop of Chichester, the careful historical picture of Professor Sykes, the shrewd caveats of the Dean of Pembroke, and the incisive spiritual teaching of the Bishop of Brechin. We hope that this small book will be widely read; its perusal will help the growth of the right approach to this vitally important matter.

The third book is *What the Church of England Stands For,* by the Bishop of London. One outstanding result of the ecumenical movement has been the growth of a desire in every part of the Church to define more clearly the truth of faith and practice which every part of the divided Church can bring to the new wholeness of the Church. This has been most noticeable on the Continent. But the Church of England needs this careful inward look of corporate loyalty and devotion most strongly at the time when she is being called upon to act as a Via Media or a Bridge Church between the Catholic and the Protestant traditions. It is worth while remembering the many attempts that have been made in the last forty years to bring the Church of England to a clearer consciousness of her heritage and her task. One recalls Archbishop Davidson, *The Character and Call of the Church of England*; H. L. Goudge, *The Church of England and Reunion*; T. A. Lacey, *Unity and Schism*; G. F. Holden, *The Anglican Claim*; Dean Duncan-Jones, *Ordered*

Liberty; Bishop E. R. Morgan and Canon Roger Lloyd, *The Mission of the Anglican Communion*; Sir Will Spens, *Belief and Practice*; Bishop Rawlinson, *Authority and Freedom*. The best recommendation which can be given to this book by the present Bishop of London is the fact it ably sustains and re-expresses, for this time, the tradition and genius of the Ecclesia Anglicana. It should find many readers all over the world, and at the same time it should greatly assist the "follow-up" of the Mission to the Diocese of London. The titles of the chapters will show its scope: The Claim of the Church of England; The Nature of Authority; Authority and the Individual; Intellectual Authority; The Authority of the Sacraments; The Rule of Worship; The Rule of Faith; The Rule of Conduct; and The Genius of the Church of England.

There is only one matter which I venture to mention; on p. 58 I think it is a pity that the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian Creed are not dealt with more definitely, and the excellent suggestion of the late Dean Armitage Robinson followed; we gain nothing by being more stiff about points like this than either Rome or the East.

H. K. Archdall.

St David's College,
Lampeter.

The Eucharistic Year. By Harold Riley. S.P.C.K. 18s. 6d.

The Liturgical Revival on the Continent has produced many books of meditation and instruction based on the liturgical year, making it possible for the faithful to see the day's Liturgy as a whole, and not as a series of isolated Scripture texts, and thereby thinking with the Church. Such books have been used with profit by Anglicans, but the differing *pericopes* employed in the Missale Romanum and the Book of Common Prayer have necessitated a considerable amount of juggling. Mr Riley has not only done this work of rearrangement, but has used his knowledge to produce a unity for each liturgical day, taking into account the special Anglican collects and Scripture texts.

He is much to be congratulated on this work, which is full of serious thought and a deep understanding of the Scriptures, so that readers of this book, or more strictly worshippers, will be able to share more closely in the mind of the Church and understand the purpose of the day's Liturgy.

Many churches have now restored the use of the Proper, particularly at the Sung Eucharist, and Mr Riley has included these Propers for each Sunday and Prayer Book Feast, giving the book a more comprehensive usefulness, and in his brief historical notes, showing how the Proper came to be chosen for that particular Feast. This makes the worshipper conscious of being an heir of the historical past of the Church.

I wish that he had elaborated the historical introduction more than he has done.

The Eucharistic Year is a book to be recommended without any

reservation to all serious-minded church-people, who are accustomed to use the Eucharist as the normal Sunday means of worship, and, as the author suggests, it will be more useful if it is read before Sunday rather than after.

The *Sanctorale* is confined exclusively to the Red Letter days of the Prayer Book. None of the Black Letter Feasts are included. This is the only adverse reflection which can be made on the book, for it imposes a limitation on its usefulness.

The author has provided an Appendix of five Roman Catholic Feasts, which he frankly admits is an arbitrary selection. One notes with surprise the omission in this Appendix of All Souls, which is now very commonly observed in the Church of England.

F. E. P. S. Langton.

London.

A History of the Evangelical Party in the Church of England. By G. R. Balleine. Church Book Room Press. 12s. 6d.

This is a republication of an old and valuable book first published in 1908 and subsequently reissued on several occasions. The last edition was published in 1933, and this one differs from it only in the replacement of a postscript by an Appendix giving a general survey of the period from 1900 to 1950. This new Appendix is of real value as an appraisement of the contents of the book itself and helps to put the whole picture in focus. There is a shrewd balancing of the strengths and weaknesses of the modern Evangelical position and plenty of fair comment which Evangelicals would do well to heed. Their lack of interest in diocesan and larger spheres is underlined, as is also the need for serious theological thinking. In this section the author of the Appendix might well have mentioned on the credit side the Evangelical Fellowship of Theological Literature, a movement begun in the 1940s and which is now beginning to bear fruit in a number of ways.

The Chronological Table of the older edition has also been brought up to 1950, and since it includes the enumeration of a number of new theological colleges the opportunity might well have been taken to revise the older Table so as to include e.g. the foundation of St Aidan's, Birkenhead, in 1846, the London College of Divinity in 1863, and of Ridley Hall in 1879. This reissue should give a new lease of life to a book that is worthy of it.

R. S. Dean.

Emmanuel College,
Saskatoon.

Catholic Political Thought 1789–1848. By Béla Menczer. Burns Oates. 18s.

This is quite a useful collection of extracts from the writings of some continental Catholics who reacted against the ideas that were represented by the French Revolution, namely Joseph de Maistre, Bonald, Chateaubriand, Balzac, Friedrich von Schlegel, Metternich,

Donoso Cortés, Jaime Balmes, and Louis Veuillot. The editor contributes an introduction which is clearly a piece of advocacy, though it is less clear what exactly is being advocated. He also contributes some biographical notes. De Maistre and Bonald are his heroes. All these writers had insights to which the prevalent Liberalism of the time was more or less blind. At the same time the book would be even more useful and more deserving of its title if it had been compiled from a more objective standpoint, and included extracts from the writings of the early Liberal Catholic political thinkers. On this account it has with justice been severely criticized in *Blackfriars* (May 1952).

CHRISTIANITY IN EUROPEAN HISTORY. By Herbert Butterfield. Oxford University Press. 5s.

In these three Riddell Memorial Lectures—on "The Making of Christendom", "Christianity and Western Civilization", and "History, Religion, and Ethics"—Professor Butterfield makes many wise observations and draws many important distinctions, and they are always felicitously expressed. His line of thought is calculated to bring more illumination into what ought to be thought about the past than into what ought to be done about the future. His principal conclusion seems to be that "it is well for us if we hold fast to Christ and to spiritual things while retaining great elasticity of mind about everything else" (p. 42). The Old Testament appears to contribute remarkably little to what he means by "Christianity".

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THEOLOGY IN THE LATER NINETEENTH CENTURY. The Burroughs Memorial Lectures, 1950. By L. E. Elliott-Binns. Longmans. 8s. 6d.

This course of lectures is intended as a continuation of V. F. Storr's *The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century*, which ended at 1860 and was never completed. Dr Elliott-Binns' treatment of the subject is much slighter, but he has packed a great deal of reliable information into a small space. His book will serve as an excellent introduction to what happened in English theology from 1860 to 1900. J. K. Mozley's *Some Tendencies in British Theology from the Publication of* Lux Mundi *to the Present Day* carries on the story, so that the history of English theology from 1800 to 1940 is covered by these three works.

UNFORGOTTEN. AN IRISH CLERGYMAN RECOLLECTS DUBLIN AND BELFAST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. A.P.C.K., Dublin. 10s. 6d.

These reminiscences of life and personalities in the Church of Ireland and of Trinity College, Dublin, in the latter part of the nineteenth century are so quietly and modestly narrated that the writer never once uses the first person singular. It is a book that will

give pleasure to anyone who is already interested in the period, the places, and the persons that it covers. One who has derived pleasure from it must also say that the anecdotage does not sparkle and delight, as Irish should.

THE MYSTICISM OF SIMONE WEIL. By Marie-Magdeleine Davy. Rockcliff. 5s. 6d.

A brief introduction, translated from the French, to the life and thought of Simone Weil, whose writings are beginning to become known in England. See also an article by Fr Jarrett-Kerr, C.R., on "A Saint on the Threshold" in *The Frontier,* January 1951.

THE GENERAL CONVENTION: OFFICES AND OFFICERS, 1785–1950. By C. Rankin Barnes. Church Historical Society, Philadelphia. N.p.

This book contains much useful information, that has never been assembled before, about the Presiding Bishops of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.A., and about other officers of the General Convention. It is well illustrated and furnished with bibliographies. The author is the present Secretary of the House of Deputies.

A. R. V.

FROM BABYLON TO BETHLEHEM. By L. E. Browne. Heffer. 6s.

It is gratifying to see a fresh edition of a book which, first printed in English, appeared in Telugu and Chinese before its reprinting into English again. This is a good indication of its value and appeal. It was commissioned by the late Bishop Azariah of Dornakal for use among his clergy and it is written with that need sensibly in mind. Now it has been revised and enlarged with the assistance of Dr Matthew Black and has lost none of its first charm in the process.

The book deals with the story of the Jews for the last five centuries before Christ—a field which has given so much scope for textual criticism—and it moves with an easy assurance, treating of broad outlines rather than minutiae. The period of Ezra and Nehemiah, and those immediately before and after them, is fraught with such historical and textual problems that it is often hard to see the wood for the trees. In this book, however, something more than a bird's-eye view enables the reader to grasp the whole scene, and many a theological student in England as elsewhere will be grateful for the help this picture gives, before coming to closer grips with the detail. The comments and exegesis on II and III Isaiah and their relations with the political and social backgrounds are particularly good and never fail to throw light upon the passages expounded.

Response to the first edition of the volume in 1926 apparently showed that students had all too little access to inter-Testament literature, and so this edition quotes freely and aptly from those sources. It is no small achievement to produce a book which will

help such various groups as sixth-form schoolboys, theological students, and clergy wanting a quick revision of an important period.

R. S. DEAN.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE,
SASKATOON.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: Louis Bouyer, *The Paschal Mystery* (18s.).
BLACKWELL: A. Duport-Sommer, *The Dead Sea Scholls* (7s. 6d.).
GEOFFREY BLES: Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Beginning and the End* (25s.).
CHURCH BOOK ROOM PRESS: F. Colquhoun (Ed.), *The Living Church in the Parish* (6s.).
DACRE PRESS: Austin Farrer, *The Crown of the Year* (6s.).
DAKERS: G. S. Spinks (in collaboration with E. L. Allen and J. Parkes), *Religion in Britain since 1900* (18s.).
EDINBURGH HOUSE PRESS: Geoffrey Allen, *Egypt: What of the Church?* (1s.).
EVANGELISCHES VERLAGSWERK (STUTTGART): Walther Bienert, *Krieg, Kriegdienst und Kriegdienstverweigerung* (D.M. 6.70).
FABER AND FABER: E. Kadloubovsky and G. E. H. Palmer (translators), *Unseen Warfare: being the Spiritual Combat and Path to Paradise of Lorenzo Scupoli as edited by Nicodemus of the Holy Mountain and revised by Theophan the Recluse* (25s.).
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION: C. E. Raven, *Alex Wood—the Man and his Message* (1s. 6d.).
HEFFER: F. Brittain, *Tales of South Mymms and Elsewhere* (4s.).
I.V.F.: R. V. G. Tasker, *The Narrow Way* (6s.).
ARTHUR JAMES: Earl R. Carlson, *Born that Way* (8s. 6d.); Rebecca Beard, *Everyman's Goal* (8s. 6d.).
MACMILLAN: Vincent Taylor, *The Gospel according to St Mark* (50s.).
JOHN MURRAY: George D. Salmon (abridged and revised by H. F. Woodhouse), *The Infallibility of the Church* (10s. 6d.).
NEWMAN BOOKSHOP (OXFORD): J. H. Newman, *The New Eve* (3s.).
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: Horton Davies, *The English Free Churches* (6s.).
PATERNOSTER PRESS: H. L. Ellison, *Men spake from God* (10s. 6d.).
PRENTICE-HALL (NEW YORK): A. William Loos (Ed.), *Religious Faith and World Culture* ($5.00).
PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED PUBLISHING CO.: B. B. Warfield, *Biblical and Theological Studies* ($4.50).
PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY: W. H. Scheide, *J. S. Bach as a Biblical Interpreter* (75 cents); E. A. Nida, *How the Word is Made Flesh: communicating the Gospel to aboriginal peoples* (75 cents).
SANDS AND CO.: E. C. Messenger, *Theology and Evolution* (21s.).
S.C.M. PRESS: C. E. Raven, *Science and the Christian Man* (4s. 6d.); Anders Nygren, *Commentary on Romans* (30s.); John A. T. Robinson, *The Body: A Study in Pauline Theology* (7s.); Stephen Neill, *Christian Partnership* (7s. 6d.).
SHEED AND WARD: Dom Illtyd Trethowan, *Christ in the Liturgy* (12s. 6d.); Fr Bruno de J. M. (Ed.), *Three Mystics* (25s.); Sister Teresia de Spiritu Sancti, *Edith Stein* (15s.).
S.P.C.K.: M. R. Newbolt, *The Book of Unveiling* (15s.); G. R. Owst, *The Destructorium Viciorum of Alexander Carpenter* (5s.); Arthur E. Henderson, *Beaulieu Abbey Then and Now* (3s. 6d.).
SWEET AND MAXWELL: N. Micklem, *Law and the Laws* (15s.).

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